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ABSTRACT
Current reforms in the public sector are characterized by the introduction of businesslike
incentive structures, in particular the introduction of ‘‘pay for performance’’ schemes in
public institutions. However, the public sector has some specific characteristics, which might
restrict the naive adoption of pay for performance. Our article analyzes whether the impact
of pay for performance on performance is bound to conditions, and if this is the case, under
which conditions pay for performance has a positive or a negative effect on performance.
We explore this contingency in a meta-analytic review of previous experimental studies on
the effects of pay for performance on performance. We further show why pay for
performance sometimes negatively affects personal efforts. With an experimental vignette
study we demonstrate (a) that motivation is likely to be a key influence on the effect of
performance-related pay on performance, and (b) that pay for performance is generally
more costly as it appears because it almost always produces hidden costs of rewards. Our
findings help to explain the modest success of pay for performance in the public sector.
There is a long-standing belief that the public sector and nonproﬁts need to be more busi-
nesslike in their attitudes and operations (Dart 2004). As a consequence, current reforms in
the public sector are characterized by the introduction of management practices and tech-
niques originally developed for the business sector, for example, budgeting techniques,
market analysis, and performance management (Lane 1997; Moynihan 2006). One of
the most signiﬁcant challenges is the introduction of businesslike incentive structures,
in particular the introduction of ‘‘pay for performance’’ schemes in public institutions (Var-
one and Giauque 2001; Swiss 2005; Cardona 2006). Two-thirds of the member countries of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and a number of
developing countries have adopted performance-related pay practices, for example, Brazil,
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Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States, and Canada
(Mookherjee 1998; OECD 2005; Cardona 2006). The underlying assumption is that cor-
rectly administrated pay for performance schemes boost the efﬁciency of the public sector
(for an overview see Burgess and Ratto 2003; for examples see Kahn, Silva, and Ziliak
2001; Swiss 2005; Lavy 2007) and positively impact employees’ motivation (Propper
2006). The proponents of pay for performance draw on standard economics, particularly
the economic principal agent view (Kaboolian 1998) as proposed by Jensen and Murphy
(1990). These theories strongly build on the model of the self-interested homo oeconomi-
cus. They take it as a matter of course that ‘‘cash compensation should be structured to
provide big rewards for outstanding performance and interesting penalties for poor perfor-
mance’’ (Jensen and Murphy 1990). The bottom line is that interests between the agent and
the principal are to be aligned via monetary incentives.
However, the public sector has some speciﬁc characteristics, which might restrict the
naive adoption of pay for performance. Incentive systems, which are effective and efﬁcient
in one organizational context might be ineffective or even counterproductive when imple-
mented in a different organizational context (Chenhall 2003). Indeed, experiences with pay
for performance schemes in the public sector are mixed. First, an OECD (2005) analysis
states ‘‘there is no conclusive empirical evidence that such an approach has effectively
helped to improve motivation and performance within the public service’’ (Cardona 2006).
Second, Perry, Mesch, and Parlberg (2006) argue that reviews that include the public sector
suggest that performance-related pay systems have generally been unsuccessful (see, e.g.,
Ingraham1993;KelloughandLu1993).Theopponentsofpayforperformanceschemesargue
that theoriesbasedonself-interestcannotprovidesufﬁcientgroundstoanalyzethemotivation
of employees, especially that of employees in the public sector (e.g., Vandenabeele and
Hondeghem 2005; Moynihan and Pandey 2007). Their criticism can be substantiated by
modern psychological economics (for an overview see Fehr and Falk 2002; Frey and Benz
2004; Tomer 2007) and motivation psychology, particularly self-determination theory
(for an overview see Deci and Ryan 2000). These theories distinguish different kinds of
motivations—extrinsic and intrinsic motivation.1 It is acknowledged that employees are
often to a high degree intrinsically motivated, that is, they perform tasks because of loyalty,
an internalized sense of duty, and/or enjoyment (Perry 2000; Vandenabeele 2007). Intrinsic
motivation, under certain conditions, is proposed to be undermined by pay for performance:
Giving someone a performance-contingent monetary incentive to do something they
already enjoy can decrease his/her motivation to do it as the person is then likely to view
its action as externally driven rather than as internally appealing. Such incentives produce
hidden costs (Lepper and Greene 1978), which has also been referred to as corruption effect
(Deci 1975), overjustiﬁcation effect (Lepper andGreene 1978), or crowding-out effect (Frey
andOberholzer-Gee1997), and thusmaynegatively impact performance.Conditions,which
are discussed to impact the relationship of pay for performance and performance, are, for
example, task type (Jenkins et al. 1998; Osterloh and Frey 2000; Frey and Osterloh 2002;
Perry, Mesch, and Paarlberg 2006) and organizational culture (Brown 2001).
The ﬁrst aim of our article is thus to analyze whether the impact of pay for perfor-
mance on performance is bound to conditions, and if this is the case, under which conditions
1 In recent years Deci and Ryan (2000) have started to offer an ever ﬁner grained categorization of motivation.
A discussion of all possible types of motivation, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
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pay for performance has a positive or a negative effect on performance. Whereas some
studies clearly show a positive relation of pay for performance on actual performance
(e.g., Prendergast 1999; Lazear 2000), others just as clearly show a negative relation
(e.g., Frey and Jegen 2001; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000b). Very few studies, however,
have tried to shed light on this inconclusive evidence by searching for possible contingency
factors (for an exception see Bertelli forthcoming; Jenkins et al. 1998). We chose to follow
the call of Perry, Mesch, and Paarlberg (2006) by identifying task type as a moderator of the
pay and performance link, as we expect high task variations in the private as well as in the
public sector. We explore this contingency in study 1 with a meta-analytic review of pre-
vious experimental studies on the effects of pay for performance on performance.
The second aim of our article is to open the black box of motivation and to identify
why pay for performance sometimes negatively affects personal efforts. Drawing on self-
determination theory (e.g., Deci 1971; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999a, 1999b) and on
crowding theory (e.g., Frey and Jegen 2001), we propose that performance-related pay
produces a cognitive shift as it ampliﬁes the meaning of rewards for behavior, that is,
it produces a price effect. At the same time it reduces the meaning of the work content
itself for behavior, that is, it produces a crowding-out effect. The overall effect of pay
for performance is thus dependent on the strength of these two subeffects. By opening
the black box of motivation and by observing both effects, we are able to show (a) that
motivation is likely to be a key inﬂuence on the effect of performance-related pay on per-
formance, and (b) that pay for performance is generally more costly as it appears because it
almost always produces hidden costs of rewards. For public management this ﬁnding could
be particularly important as current reforms in public management are bound to produce
a small price effect only, whereas the crowding-out effect in the current implementation
practice is bound to be rather high. We test our assumptions on how pay for performance
effects change in motivation and intended behavior in study 2 with an experimental vignette
study that mimics a complex, upper management or civil servant–level work context.
STUDY 1: PAY FOR PERFORMANCE, TASK TYPE, AND PERFORMANCE
Hypotheses
The issue of whether performance-related pay really improves efﬁciency and productivity
is highly contested (Francois 2000; Moynihan 2007). Two opposing views exist both in the
private and public sectors.
On the one hand, researchers stemming from standard economics and behavioral man-
agement theory argue that performance-related pay raises individual performance if it is
correctly administrated. Therefore, these researchers focus their efforts on discussing the
technically correct implementation of performance-related pay such as how problems of
measurability might be overcome (for a thorough discussion about possible implementation
problems, see Burgess and Ratto 2003). On the other hand, researchers with a psychological
economics2 or self-determination theory background argue that beyond these
2 Psychological economics is a combination of economics and psychology. It is often referred to as behavioral
economics. However, in our opinion this term is misleading. In psychology, the term ‘‘behaviorist’’ denotes
a scientiﬁc approach that investigates observable stimulus-response relationships as this is the case with standard
economics and behavioral management theory. Thus, we prefer to use the term ‘‘psychological economics,’’
which also includes theories that model cognitive and emotional processes (see also Tomer 2007).
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implementation problems there is a more fundamental problem caused by performance-
related pay: It is proposed that this form of pay harms individual performance in the case
of interesting tasks. Tasks are considered to be interesting if they are perceived to be chal-
lenging, enjoyable, and/or purposeful. These researchers conclude that task type is an im-
portant moderator of the effect of pay for performance on actual performance (Frey and
Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Perry, Mesch, and Paarlberg 2006).
For public administration, the consequences of this second view are arguably more
severe than that for the private sector for two reasons. First, current reforms of the public
sector predominantly target senior civil servants (OECD 2005). Senior civil servants,
however, are more likely to work on interesting tasks than lower ranked public servants
as their job content is likely to be broader, more responsible and more challenging. Thus,
performance-related pay might be directed toward the wrong recipients. Second, an effec-
tively managed public administration agency is likely to provide predominantly interesting
activities to take advantage of beneﬁcial self-selection of employees (Behn 1995). It is
often proposed that people do not enter the public service to maximize income; instead,
they hope to do interesting work (e.g., Perry 1997;Wise 2004; Buelens and Van den Broeck
2007). Thus, the public sector needs to offset differences in the level of compensation
between the public and the private sector by offering nonpecuniary beneﬁts, such as in-
teresting work, to keep levels of motivation high (Rainey 1983; Francois 2000). In addition,
recent formal theory has uncovered institutional incentives that may explain why public
agencies are better off to attract and retain intrinsically motivated, policy-concerned
individuals: Intrinsically motivated public service agents are shown to have a higher
incentive to invest in expert knowledge than extrinsically motivated ones and therefore
function as the ‘‘institutional memory’’ of public service (Gailmard and Patty 2007).
Extrinsically motivated public service agents, on the other hand, will only acquire expertise
if their learning is conditioned to material incentives and such a conditioning in the public
service is difﬁcult as not all relevant expertise development can be monitored.
In the following we discuss these two views in more detail.
Standard Economic and Behavioral Management View
Standard economic theory is based on the assumption of rational, selﬁsh, and extrinsically
motivated actors, the so-called homo oeconomicus (see Fehr and Ga¨chter 1998; Frey 1999),
who react to external incentives in a predictable manner. This is implicitly based on the
stimulus-response theory, which involves only observable factors in a black-box treatment.
Changes in behavior are traced back to changes in restrictions, and not to changes in pref-
erences (see Stigler and Becker 1977). As a consequence, human behavior can be directed
through the selective deployment of rewards or sanctions. Individuals will perform best
when the incentive system links rewards as closely as possible to performance. The same
argument is also supported by behavioral management theory. Behavioral management
theory argues that pay for performance enhances personal efforts and thus individual per-
formance (e.g., Luthans and Kreitner 1985; Lehman and Geller 2004).
Behavioral management scholars and standard economists have conducted a number of
studies tosupport thisargument (for anoverviewseePrendergast 1999; Stajkovic andLuthans
2003). Lazear (2000), for example, analyzed the case of Safelite, the United States’ largest
windshield manufacturer. In the mid-1990s Safelite replaced hourly wages by piece rates
(with a guaranteed minimum wage). As a result productivity improved by 44% (Lazear
2000). In a recent overview of the literature, Rynes, Gerhart, and Parks (2005) conclude that
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‘‘PE (performance evaluation) and PFP (pay for performance) are two of the most powerful
tools in anorganization’smotivational arsenal . . . sopowerful that oneof themain challenges
for managers is to make sure that their compensation systems are not motivating the wrong
kinds of behavior’’ (Rynes, Gerhart, and Parks 2005).
The Psychological Economics and Self-determination View
In contrast to the standard economics view, psychological economics and self-determination
theory argue that there are different types of motivations—extrinsic and intrinsic motivation
(Frey 1997; Lindenberg 2001; Deci and Ryan 2002)—and that performance of intrinsically
motivated tasks is harmed by pay for performance.
Psychological economics and self-determination theory suggest that motivation is not
a unitary phenomenon. Individuals may not only have different levels of motivation but
also experience different kinds of motivation depending on the speciﬁcities of the orga-
nizational context and of the task characteristics (Ryan and Deci 2000). Extrinsic motiva-
tion satisﬁes personal needs indirectly, that is, extrinsic motivation refers to doing
something because it leads to separable outcomes such as monetary compensation (Ryan
and Deci 2000). Money cannot produce direct utility, but it enables an individual to acquire
desired products. Intrinsic motivation, in contrast, satisﬁes personal needs directly (Frey
and Jegen 2001) by creating an intrinsic reward for those who perform the tasks (George
1992). Tasks are thought to be intrinsically rewarding if they are perceived to be interesting,
that is, to be challenging, enjoyable, or purposeful. In the remainder of this article we will
call these tasks ‘‘interesting tasks’’ (Hackman and Lawler 1971; Golombiewski 1980;
Kuvaas 2006). In short, psychological economics and self-determination theory assume that
individuals may also derive utility from the activity itself (Deci 1975; Lindenberg 2001).
Pay for performance is proposed to have under certain conditions a negative, crowd-
ing-out effect on intrinsic motivation.3 For this reason especially the performance of in-
teresting tasks is likely to suffer upon the introduction of performance-related pay (Ryan
and Deci 2000; Frey and Jegen 2001). This argument is supported by numerous experi-
ments and ﬁeld studies in psychology (e.g., Deci 1971; Lepper and Greene 1978; Amabile
1998) and psychological economics (e.g., Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Fehr and Falk
2002; Irlenbusch and Sliwka 2003; Falk and Kosfeld 2006). For example, McGraw and
McCullers (1979) show that contingently rewarded students perform considerably worse
than their unpaid colleagues at interesting ‘‘out-of-the-box’’-thinking tasks. A further ex-
ample is the experiment by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a), which analyze parental re-
sponse to the introduction of a ﬁnancial incentive to collect their children on time from
day care. In a number of day care centers a ﬁne was introduced for late-coming parents.
Contrary to the expected effect, this ﬁne did not induce parents to collect their children on
time but instead led to a steep increase in the number of latecomers.
As a consequence, psychological economics and self-determination theory propose that
pay for performance hurts performance in the case of interesting tasks. In contrast, standard
economics and behavioral management theory propose that pay for performance increases
performance, independent of the type of task involved. Thus, these two conﬂicting views lead
to the following hypotheses:
3 But see the ‘‘reward’’ controversy between Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999a, 1999b) and Eisenberger, Pierce, and
Cameron (1999).
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H1a Pay for performance increases performance irrespective of the rewarded task.
H1b Pay for performance increases performance in the case of less interesting tasks and
decreases performance in the case of interesting tasks.
In a next step we test these competing hypotheses with a meta-analysis.
Meta-analysis
Methods
There have only been very few meta-analyses, which focus exclusively on the effect of pay
for performance on performance (for an overview in public administration, see Perry,
Mesch, and Paarlberg 2006), and to our knowledge there has only been one meta-analysis
which seeks to test for the moderating effect of differentially motivating tasks (Jenkins et al.
1998). We suggest that this meta-analysis needs to be complemented for three reasons:
First, Jenkins et al. (1998) are primarily interested in the explained variance. They do
not analyze the direction of the inﬂuence of pay for performance on work efforts as they
are not interested in the change of signs depending on the type of tasks. Second, the authors
concentrate exclusively on results found in psychology and organizational behavior jour-
nals. Results reported in economic journals are not taken into account, and thus, studies
from standard economics and psychological economics are neglected. Third, their study has
a cutoff point of 1996, so the meta-analysis stops at a time when studies of motivation in
psychological economics were just starting to gain momentum (see the highly cited Frey
and Oberholzer-Gee 1997).
Sample
We apply the following rules of inclusion: We focus on experimental studies which (a) ad-
dress the effect of incentives on task performance and not on some other dependent variable,
(b) report ‘‘hard’’ performance measures (quantity and/or quality measures), (c) introduce
pay for performance on an individual level, (d) have a control group, (e) provide enough
information to allow us to determine the effects of pay for performance on performance,
and (f) use adult populations. We identiﬁed these studies through four search avenues. First,
we conducted computerized database searches from 19714 to 2006 using the key words ‘‘pay
for performance,’’ ‘‘tangible rewards,’’ ‘‘monetary rewards,’’ ‘‘performance-contingent
rewards,’’ ‘‘performance,’’ and ‘‘intrinsic motivation.’’ Second, we conducted manual
searches of those journals that featured prominently in our database search, namely Acad-
emy of Management Journal, American Journal of Psychology, Journal of Accounting
Research, Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Management Accounting Research,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Organi-
zational Behavior and Human Performance, and Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes. Third, we examined the reference lists in several meta-analyses.5
Finally, we made a query for unpublished working papers in the ﬁeld of economics.
We conducted this query because in this ﬁeld the search for studies is particularly difﬁcult
as economists often do not report simple correlation coefﬁcients or F values needed for
4 We took 1971 as the starting point because it was in this year that the ﬁrst study on the undermining effect of
tangible rewards was published.
5 Bonner et al. (2000); Cameron and Pierce (1994); Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999); Eisenberger and Cameron
(1996); Jenkins et al. (1998); Rummel and Feinberg (1988); Wiersma (1992).
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Table 1
Study 1: Statistic for Each Study of the Meta-analysis
ID Study Name
Number of
Subgroups
within Study
Control Sample
Size (mean)
Bonus
Sample
Size (mean)
Standard
Difference in
Means
(performance
bonus group 2
performance
control group)a Signiﬁcance SE
Z
Value
Journal
(1 5 economic,
2 5 psychological)
Task
(1 5 simple
and/or boring,
2 5 difﬁcult
and/or
interesting)
Outcome
Measurement
(1 5 quality,
2 5 quantity)
1 Ashton (1990) 2 23 25.5 0.22 0.20 1.10 1 1 2
2 Bailey, Brown, and
Cocco (1998)
2 24 24 0.81 *** 0.21 3.80 1 1 2
3 Baumeister (1984) 2 9 9 21.07 *** 0.36 22.99 2 1 2
4 Brockner and Vasta (1981) 1 26 26 20.49 * 0.28 21.73 2 2 2
5 Campbell (1984) 16 14 14 20.63 *** 0.10 26.50 2 2 1
6 Chow (1983) 10 10.4 10.4 0.66 *** 0.14 4.62 1 1 2
7 Daniel and Esser (1980) 1 32 32 1.51 *** 0.28 5.34 2 2 2
8 Fabes, Moran, and
McCullers (1981)
23 19 22.3 20.29 *** 0.07 24.39 2 1 and 2 1 and 2
9 Farh, Griffeth, and
Balkin (1991)
1 14 8 1.58 *** 0.50 3.14 2 1 2
10 Farr (1976) 1 45 45 2.56 *** 0.28 8.99 2 1 2
11 Fatseas and Hirst (1992) 8 15 15 0.37 *** 0.13 2.86 1 1 2
12 Fehr and Go¨tte (2005) 2 22 20 20.02 0.22 20.10 1 1 2
13 Fossum (1979) 3 20 20 1.39 *** 0.20 6.84 2 1 2
14 Frey and Go¨tte (1999) 2 306 63.5 0.11 0.12 0.96 1 2 2
15 Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000)
5 48 48 20.17 * 0.09 21.86 1 2 2
16 Hamner and Foster (1975) 8 16 16 0.11 0.13 .90 2 1 & 2 1 & 2
17 Harackiewicz, Manderlink,
and Sansone (1984)
1 15 15 0.87 ** 0.38 2.29 2 2 2
18 Henry and Strickland (1994) 1 68 69 0.99 *** 0.18 5.49 2 1 2
19 Hogarth et al. (1991) 2 20 20 0.36 0.23 1.59 2 2 2
Continued
3
9
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Table 1 (continued)
Study 1: Statistic for Each Study of the Meta-analysis
ID Study Name
Number of
Subgroups
within Study
Control Sample
Size (mean)
Bonus
Sample
Size (mean)
Standard
Difference in
Means
(performance
bonus group 2
performance
control group)a Signiﬁcance SE
Z
Value
Journal
(1 5 economic,
2 5 psychological)
Task
(1 5 simple
and/or boring,
2 5 difﬁcult
and/or
interesting)
Outcome
Measurement
(1 5 quality,
2 5 quantity)
20 Lazear (2000) 1 1,377 1,377 0.36 *** 0.04 9.33 1 1 2
21 Lee, Locke, and Phan (1997) 12 11.7 11.5 20.33 *** 0.12 22.72 1 2 2
22 Libby and Lipe (1992) 2 40 38 0.33 ** 0.16 2.04 1 1 2
23 Lienhard (2006) 1 112 112 0.43 *** 0.14 3.16 2 1 2
24 Lopez (1981) 1 93 93 1.18 *** 0.16 7.42 2 1 1
ID Study Name
Number of
Subgroups
within Study
Control
Sample
Size
(mean)
Bonus Sample
Size (mean)
Standard
Difference in
Means
(performance
bonus group 2
performance
control group)a
p
Value SE
Z
Value
Journal
(1 5 economic,
2 5 psychological)
Task
(1 5 simple
and/or boring,
2 5 difﬁcult
and/or
interesting)
Outcome
Measurement
(1 5 quality,
2 5 quantity)
25 Mowen, Middlemist,
and Luther (1981)
1 62 62 20.46 *** 0.18 22.53 2 2 2
26 Paarsch and Shearer (2000) 1 17 17 1.08 *** 0.37 2.93 1 2
27 Phillips and Freedman (1988) 4 17 17 0.70 *** 0.18 3.97 2 1 and 2 2
28 Pinder (1976) 2 20 20 0.75 ** 0.33 2.30 2 1 2
29 Pokorny (1994) 8 17 17 20.03 0.12 20.22 1 and 2 2
30 Pritchard, Campbell, and
Campbell (1977)
1 14 14 0.18 0.38 0.48 2 2 2
31 Remus, O’Connor,
and Griggs (1998)
2 17 17 0.01 0.24 0.05 2 1 1
32 Saari and Latham (1982) 3 12 12 2.43 *** 0.31 7.82 2 1 2
Continued
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Table 1 (continued)
Study 1: Statistic for Each Study of the Meta-analysis
ID Study Name
Number of
Subgroups
within Study
Control
Sample
Size
(mean)
Bonus Sample
Size (mean)
Standard
Difference in
Means
(performance
bonus group 2
performance
control group)a
p
Value SE
Z
Value
Journal
(1 5 economic,
2 5 psychological)
Task
(1 5 simple
and/or boring,
2 5 difﬁcult
and/or
interesting)
Outcome
Measurement
(1 5 quality,
2 5 quantity)
33 Scott, Farh, and
Podsakoff (1988)
1 48 48 2.69 *** 0.28 9.56 2 2 2
34 Shearer (2004) 1 9 9 0.85 * 0.49 1.73 1 1 2
35 Stajkovic and Luthans (2001) 2 23.5 23 0.50 ** 0.21 2.39 2 1 1 and 2
36 Stone and Ziebart (1995) 1 42 42 1.05 *** 0.23 4.50 2 1 1
37 Terborg and Miller (1978) 2 30 30 0.08 0.18 0.45 2 2 1 and 2
38 Turnage and Muchinsky (1976) 1 20 20 21.49 *** 0.36 24.16 2 1 2
39 Turnage and Muchinsky (1976) 1 20 20 1.19 *** 0.34 3.47 2 2 2
40 Vecchio (1982) 2 43 0 20.26 0.16 21.56 2 2 1 and 2
41 Wageman and Baker (1997) 2 36 38 0.84 *** 0.17 4.90 2 1 2
42 Wimperis and Farr (1979) 1 16 16 21.51 *** 0.40 23.76 2 2 2
43 Wright (1990) 3 55 55 0.46 *** 0.11 4.10 2 1 2
44 Yukl and Latham (1975) 2 13 12.5 20.69 ** 0.29 22.39 2 1 2
45 Yukl, Latham, and
Pursell (1976)
3 15 15 20.29 0.22 21.30 2 1 2
46 Yukl, Wexley, and
Seymore (1972)
3 5 5 1.80 *** 0.43 4.16 2 1 2
aIn this column, positive values indicates that monetary rewards raise the work performance and negative values indicate that monetary rewards decrease the work performance.
*p , .1, **p , .05, ***p , .01.
3
9
5
computation in a meta-analysis. The four search avenues and the ﬁve inclusion rules
yielded 46 empirical studies (total sample size of the 46 studies5 27,524) with 155 usable
subgroup samples (total sample size of the 155 subgroup samples 5 46,363). Descriptive
information of these studies is contained in Table 1.6
Procedures
Our meta-analysis was conducted using the approach of Hunter and Schmidt (2004).
Meta-analysis allows the aggregation of results across separate studies and thus provides
an estimate of the true relationship between two variables in a population. The zero-order
correlations between the variables of interest are weighted by the sample size of the study to
calculate the mean weighted correlation across all the studies in the analysis. The standard
deviation of the observed correlations is then calculated to estimate their true variability.
Computations for the meta-analysis were performed by using the Comprehensive
Meta-analysis (Borenstein 2000). This software package allows to control for three
artifacts—sampling error, measurement error, and range restriction—which mask true
variability by employing the artifact distribution formulas of Hunter and Schmidt.
Nonindependence and Outliers
As noted, many of the 46 studies report more than one mean difference between the
rewarded group and the control group. We used the following criteria to ensure an accept-
able level of independence among those studies with multiple subgroups. For studies with
multiple independent samples, statistics from each sample were included. If a sample
reported more than one statistic for a single relationship (for instance, because it involved
multiple operationalizations of the same construct), we combined these statistics. Further,
we plotted a study’s effect size against its standard error to detect outliers. The studies
were distributed symmetrically about the combined effect size and point out the absence
of publication bias.
Moderator
Since we aim to analyze the overall relationship of pay for performance and performance,
as well as the relationship dependent on task type, a moderator analysis was conducted. We
asked two coders to independently sort the experiments into two categories: noninteresting
and interesting tasks. This particular coding was chosen as we assume noninteresting tasks
to be predominantly extrinsically motivated and interesting tasks to be more clearly intrin-
sically motivated. In 15% of the cases there was no agreement between the coders, and
therefore, a third expert was asked to decide on the ﬁnal ballot. Subsequently, the total
sample was divided into two groups according to task type. For each group a separate
net effect and a critical ratio can be calculated.
6 As seen in the table, our analysis mainly builds on studies conducted in the laboratory, in the private sector or in the
public domain. There are no studies included from the public sector. This can be explained by the fact that we restricted
our sample to experimental studies, which are less numerous in the public sector, and that we chose journals that are
more likely to publish basic research rather than applied research. The resulting restrictions for the generalizability of
our results, however, apply not only to public management but also to all speciﬁc industries that have not been included
in the meta-analysis. Further research is certainly needed to claim the transferability of these results to all possible
contexts.
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Results and Discussion
Table 2 illustrates the results of our meta-analysis: Overall we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive
net effect of pay for performance on performance (0.23**). Task type consistently mod-
erated this effect: Pay for performance increases performance in the case of noninteresting
tasks (0.42***), whereas in the case of interesting tasks pay for performance reduces per-
formance (20.13***). Thus, the ﬁndings of the meta-analysis substantiate Hypothesis 1b.
On the basis of these ﬁndings hypothesis 1a has to be refuted.
Our results contradict the ﬁndings of the meta-analysis of Jenkins et al. (1998). The
authors do not ﬁnd a moderating effect of task type. These differences can be explained by
two facts. First, we have analyzed the data to distinguish direction effects, whereas Jenkins
et al. (1998) have looked for explained variance. Second, Jenkins et al. (1998) were sug-
gesting that their coding in intrinsic/extrinsic tasks might have been too crude. Jenkins et al.
(1998) distinguished task types by referring to the original classiﬁcation by the researchers
who conducted the experiment. We applied a different coding strategy and cross-checked
self-labeling by the author with expert coder’s perception of the tasks studied.
To control the validity of our ﬁndings we additionally tested whether the type of pub-
lication outlet moderated the ﬁndings. We found no moderator effect of the publication
outlet, that is, studies published both in economic and in psychological journals show a
positive and commensurate net effect of tangible rewards on performance (0.26***
and 0.22***).
STUDY 2: PAY FOR PERFORMANCE, MOTIVATION AND PERFORMANCE
Hypotheses
The aim of this second study is to identify why pay for performance sometimes negatively
affects personal efforts. We open the black box of motivation and analyze the effect of
performance-contingent rewards on motivation directly. We suggest that performance-
contingent rewards affect a cognitive shift, which promotes two opposing motivational
effects (Frey 1997). On the one hand, performance-contingent rewards subdue the inter-
nalized meaning of the work itself, that is, lowers the power of intrinsic motivation for
Table 2
Study 1: Results of the Meta-analysis
Model
Number of Studies
(number of subgroups) Est.a SE Z Value
Heterogeneity
(Q value)
Overall effect 46 (155) 0.23*** 0.02 11.03 700.56***
Task type
Noninteresting tasks 31 (82) 0.42*** 0.03 16.24 338.88***
Interesting tasks 20 (73) 20.13*** 0.04 23.46 235.17***
Journal
Economic 11 (47) 0.26*** 0.03 8.87 72.36***
Psychological 34 (99) 0.21*** 0.03 6.75 616.09***
aIn this column, positive values indicates that monetary rewards raise the work performance and negative values indicate that monetary
rewards decrease the work performance.
Est., Estimate
*p , .1, **p , .05, ***p , .01.
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a particular activity: Pay for performance causes a crowding-out effect. On the other hand,
pay for performance strengthens the meaning of external rewards, that is, boosts the power
of extrinsic motivation for a particular activity: Pay for performance causes a price effect on
motivation and performance. The overall effect thus is dependent on the relative strength of
the two unobservable contradicting effects.
There are two reasons why we believe it is important to open this black box of mo-
tivation. First, a well-funded critique of the possible negative effects of pay for performance
on intrinsic motivation argues that most studies are subject to circular reasoning (e.g., Kunz
and Pfaff 2002). Most experimental studies stipulate the crowding-out effect post hoc to
explain why performance-contingent rewards were found to have no uniform positive
effect on performance. This can be illustrated with a ﬁeld experiment of Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000b). The authors investigate the inﬂuence of monetary incentives on the
behavior of pupils while making a voluntary collection. A total of 180 pupils were divided
into three random groups. The ﬁrst group received no reward, the second group received
1%, and the third group 10%, of the sum collected. The group receiving 1% collected sig-
niﬁcantly less than that which received nothing more than a ‘‘thank-you.’’ The third group
collected more than the second group, yet still collected less than the ﬁrst group. The in-
terpretation of this ﬁnding is that the weak monetary incentive of 1% of the sum collected
crowd-out the pupils’ intrinsic motivation. The stronger incentive of 10% of the sum col-
lected is interpreted to raise individual efforts again by the price effect. It strengthens the
pupil’s extrinsic motivation. However, the opposing effects are postulated post hoc. They
provide no conclusive evidence for changes in motivation because they do not look into the
black box but only consider observable outputs.
Second, public management in contrast to private sector management is often plagued
by a severe limitation of funding available for performance-related pay: Merit increments
tend to be below a maximum of 5% (OECD 2005). As a consequence, the possible price
effect of performance-related pay is probably rather low. The crowding-out effect, how-
ever, could be high because the job content and intrinsic rewards seem to be important
drivers of public service employees (Francois 2000; Frank, and Lewis 2004; Le Grand
2006). If we can show that both effects are decisive for the magnitude and direction of
the inﬂuence of pay for performance on performance, public sector management should
reconsider the current use of pay for performance: A low-price effect coupled with
a high-crowding-out effect are bound to result in a drop in performance.
To open the black box of motivation and to analyze the unobservable cognitive pro-
cesses, we will draw on self-determination theory (Deci 1985; Deci, Connell, and Ryan
1989)7: Based on the concept of the ‘‘locus of causality’’ (De Charms 1968), the theory
7 Psychological economics has offered a number of alternative theoretical explanations for the crowding-out effect,
which will not be discussed in this article in more detail for limited space reasons. For example, Benabou and Tirole
(2003) suggest that individuals—under some conditions—perceive pay for performance as an indicator for the
desirability of an assignment: Highly incentivized tasks are projected to be unpleasant. These attributions impact
the subsequent willingness of individuals to exert personal efforts at such tasks. While, for example, Gneezy and
Rusticchini (2000b) suggest that the undermining effect of pay for performance may be best explained by its
framing effect, the introduction of pay for performance signals to the employee that a former incomplete work
contract is now complete. Under this new regime additional—voluntary—efforts become obsolete. Thus, efforts
are exerted only to the point as being speciﬁed and paid for. For additional explanations of the crowding-out
effect, see Fehr and Falk (2002), Gneezy (2004), and Sliwka (2003).
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(a) systematically explains the transition from intrinsic to extrinsic motivation and (b) ac-
counts for why and under which conditions external incentives lead to a shift in motivation.
Locus of Causality
Self-determination theory analyzes the inﬂuence of pay for performance on the perceived
locus of causality (De Charms 1968). The perceived locus of causality is a personal attri-
bution of behavior: Individuals distinguish to what degree an activity is initiated and en-
dorsed by themselves (internal locus of causality) or to what degree an activity is forced
upon them (external locus of causality) (De Charms 1968). Intrinsic motivation is linked to
an internal locus of causality. In contrast, extrinsic motivation is the result of external pres-
sure and thus is linked to an external locus of causality (Ryan and Connell 1989). In reality
the degree to which behavior is self-initiated or externally initiated varies. For many
activities, both types of motivations simultaneously play a role.
Motivation Shift
Self-determination theory analyzeswhy and inwhich direction the locus of causality, andwith
it motivation, is changed (Deci 1980). It works from the assumption that individuals have
a need for self-determination (Deci 1985; Deci and Flaste 1995): Individuals prefer to ac-
tively engage with their environment and, if given the chance to do so, self-initiate their
activities (Deci and Ryan 2000). This is, for example, the case if individuals are given ex-
tensive rights for participation in decision making (Leana, Ahlbrandt, and Murrell 1992;
Mayer and Schoorman 1998). In such an environment intrinsic motivation is strengthened
as individuals perceive themselves to be ‘‘master of their owndestiny.’’At the same time this
perception of self-determination buffers their experience of external pressure. External pres-
sure is viewed to be more distant and thus extrinsic motivation is weakened.
Pay for performance, however, has been shown to heighten the salience of external
control and thus to reduce perceptions of self-determination (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan
1999a, 1999b). In such an environment individuals perceive themselves to be ‘‘puppet
on strings,’’ whereby their intrinsic motivation is thwarted (Deci 1971). This crowding-
out effect is perhaps most clearly seen when one attempts to reward activities that are
not normally compensated monetarily, such as play or learning. But this effect also occurs
when one offers additional ﬁnancial incentives for tasks that are already compensated. The
reason is that pay for performance relative to ﬁxed wages causes a salient perception of
control. First, Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999) show in a meta-analysis that the more
contingent ﬁnancial incentives are administered, the higher perceptions of control become:
For example, task-contingent rewards hardly undermine intrinsic motivation, whereas
completion-contingent rewards are found to undermine intrinsic motivation quite severely.
Second, pay for performance creates recurring events of anxiety and salience (Gerhart and
Rynes 2003) and thus has been found to lead to emotional arousal (Campbell, Campbell,
and Chia 1998) and exhaustion (Brown and Benson 2003).
As a consequence, pay for performance has been suggested to crowd-out intrinsic
motivation and to strengthen extrinsic motivation, that is, to produce a price effect. This
leads to the following hypotheses:
H2 Pay for performance affects the relation between intrinsic motivation and effort
negatively: High performance-contingent rewards reduce the effect of intrinsic
motivation on effort.
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H3 Pay for performance affects the relation between extrinsic motivation and effort
positively: High performance-contingent rewards increase the effect of extrinsic
motivation on effort.
The relative strength of both contrary unobservable effects is dependent on the orig-
inal motivation for a task and produces the observable total effect on behavior.
Vignette Study
Experimental Design
To analyze the proposed motivation shift, we conducted a vignette study, also called a fac-
torial survey (Rossi and Anderson 1982). Vignette studies are suited to the analysis of the
conditions of social contexts, for instance, the scope of norms. Vignettes provide ‘‘. . . short
descriptions of a person or a social situation which contain precise references to what are
thought to be (. . .) important factors in decision-making or judgment-making processes of
the respondents. . .’’ (Alexander and Becker 1978). Within the description, the independent
variables are systematically varied by the experimenter. Then the targeted variable, for
instance, behavioral intentions, is asked about.
Participants are led to weigh the signiﬁcance of single characteristics to arrive at an
overall preference for one alternative. As in reality, the participants are involved in a trade-
off. In short, vignette analyses, like the conjoint method, are based on the following three
concepts: (a) Every situation consists of a bundle of characteristics; (b) every participant
makes an individual evaluation of the beneﬁts of various combinations of characteristics;
(c) the combination of the beneﬁts of various characteristics provides the relative overall
beneﬁt to an individual.
Experimental Procedure
Our vignette is composed of 10 independent factor variables. The vignette was modeled to
represent a complex, project-type work environment, which is typical for professional, up-
per level managerial and civil servant work. Each factor represents a different characteristic
of the organizational context and can be given a positive value (e.g., ‘‘you can largely or-
ganize your own working day’’) or a negative value (e.g., ‘‘the organization of your work-
ing day is prescribed for you’’). The vignette covers three dimensions of a working context:
job design, work climate, and external incentives.
The design we used was not a reduced design, in contrast to most conjoint method
experiments. We asked the entire combination of vignettes across several participants. This
procedure possesses the advantage that an analysis of the moderation effects between test
factors and effect factors is later possible. The consideration of moderating inﬂuences of
contextual factors is widespread in the social sciences and should also be observed in ex-
perimental designs. The different vignettes were allocated randomly to respondents; each
respondent had to answer three vignettes.
To achieve a high external validity and to avoid cognitive overload we conducted a
pretest with executive MBA students (100 questionnaires and 300 vignettes, response rate
25%). As a result the vignettes were shortened (one variable was dropped) and the wording
was adapted. Our main study was conducted in 2006 with 186 part-time executive MBA
students on-site, who each ﬁlled out three vignettes (149 questionnaires and 447 completely
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ﬁlled vignettes, response rate 80%). A typical respondent had been working for 9 years and
had completed a college of professional studies; 67% have managing functions.
Operationalization
The dependent variable—performance—was modeled as a task that could theoretically be
motivated intrinsically as well as extrinsically. This way we are more likely to be able to
show the motivation shift in both directions. The vignettes present hypothetical project
situations for which we then asked intended work behavior. We measure work performance
with the following item: ‘‘To complete these tasks, I will within my working hours invest
additional timeinmeetingswhich,althoughvoluntary,aresigniﬁcantfor theproject.Estimate
howmany hours of your working week you would give’’ (scale:.5 h;3–4 h;2 h;1 h;
no hours). Intended behavior may be overstated due to a social desirability bias. We tried to
reduce thisproblemwith thehelpof a randomdesign:Aseachpersonanswers threevignettes,
the random design controls for some person-speciﬁc errors. However, we do not measure
behavior itself, which has to be taken into account when interpreting the results.
Three variables measured the main effects: pay for performance, extrinsic motivation,
and intrinsic motivation. Pay for performance was modeled with two different values: (0)
Your pay does not vary. You receive a ﬁxed salary. (1) Your pay varies widely. It consists
of 50% ﬁxed salary and a 50% performance-contingent bonus. Extrinsic and intrinsic
motivationswere measured with a version of the self-regulation questionnaire that assesses
the degree to which an individual’s perceived locus of causality for a particular behavior
tends to be internal or external (Ryan and Connell 1989). The instrument has been validated
in various ﬁelds of motivation research (e.g., Grolnick, Ryan, and Deci 1991; Biddle, Soos,
and Chatzisarantis 1999). The participants have to indicate on a 1–5 scale why they have
chosen a particular behavior (‘‘Referring to your previous answer about the use of addi-
tional time in meetings: please describe why you give this much additional time’’). Intrinsic
Table 3
Study 2: Means, SD, and Correlation Matrix (447 vignettes from 149 people)
Measures Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Additional performance 3.52 0.96
2 Performance-contingent
pay
0.42 0.49 .09**
3 Intrinsic motivation 3.76 0.77 .53*** .03
4 Extrinsic motivation 3.30 1.03 .18*** .15*** .28***
5 Realistic vignettes 2.64 0.83 2.25*** .05 2.17*** 2.11**
6 Gender 0.58 0.49 2.11** .01 2.19*** 2.07 .14**
7 Year of birth 1977 4.98 2.04 .07 2.18*** .01 .08* .06
8 Length of employment 9.48 5.75 .01 2.05 .16*** 2.05 2.11** 2.03 2.53***
9 Complexity of knowledge
in current work
3.89 0.94 .10 .06 .03 .05 2.01 .03 .01 .10**
Note:Measurements and scales: (1) Additional performance: To complete these tasks, I will within my working hours invest additional
time in meetings which, while voluntary, are signiﬁcant for the project (15 no hours, 55.5 h). (2) Performance-contingent pay: 05
pay is ﬁxed, or, performance-contingent pay is only slight (5% bonus), 1 5 pay is performance contingent (50% bonus). (4) Intrinsic
motivation: Additional time in meetings (a) because I like doing this (15 strongly disagree, 55 strongly agree) and (b) because I think
it is the right thing to do. It reﬂects my personal work ethics (1 5 strongly disagree, 5 5 strongly agree). (5) Extrinsic motivation:
Additional time in meetings because another behavior would involve many disadvantages for me (1 5 strongly disagree, 55 strongly
agree). (6) Realistic vignettes: 15 very unrealistic, 55 very realistic. (7) Gender: 05 female, 15male. (8) Length of employment: in
years. (9) Complexity of knowledge in current work: 1 5 not knowledge intensive, 5 5 very knowledge intensive.
N 5 447, *p , .1, **p , .05, ***p , .01.
Weibel et al. Pay for Performance in the Public Sector 401
motivation corresponds to an internal locus of causality and was measured with the items
(a) ‘‘I behave so because I like doing this’’ and (b) ‘‘I behave so because I think it is the right
thing to do. It reﬂects my personal work ethics.’’ Extrinsic motivation corresponds to an
external locus of causality and was measured with the item ‘‘I behave so because another
behavior would involve many disadvantages for me.’’
The two interaction effects—the crowding-out and the price effect—were operation-
alized in the following way. We measured the crowding-out effect as the effect of intrinsic
motivation on performance dependent on the existence of pay for performance (1 5 yes,
0 5 no). A negative, signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of intrinsic motivation on performance in the
case of the existence of pay for performance corresponds to Hypothesis H2. We measured
the price effect as the effect of extrinsic motivation on performance dependent on the ex-
istence of pay for performance (1 5 yes, 0 5 no). A positive, signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of
extrinsic motivation on performance in the case of the existence of pay for performance
corresponds to Hypothesis H3.
In addition we controlled for a number of other inﬂuencing factors. At the level of each
vignette we controlled the participants’ perception of the realism of the individual vignettes
(scale: 15 very unrealistic, 55 very realistic). Further, at the level of each respondent we
controlled for gender, year of birth, length of employment (in years), and the complexity of
knowledge in their current work (scale: 15 not knowledge intensive, 55 very knowledge
intensive) (Table 3).
Analytical Method
We used multilevel mixed-effects linear regression. Mixed models are characterized as
containing both ﬁxed effects and random effects. The ﬁxed effects are analogous to stan-
dard regression coefﬁcients and are estimated directly. Fixed effects thus indicate the
‘‘true’’ effects of variables on outcomes. The random effects are not directly estimated
but are summarized according to their estimated variances and covariances. Random
effects take the form of the grouping structure of the data, which consist of multiple levels
of nested groups. The model thus takes into account that every person answered three
vignettes. One caveat of our model should be kept in mind when interpreting our results:
The problemwith self-assessment questions is that responses to them differ across respond-
ents according to both the actual level and interpersonal incomparability. The advantage of
mixed-effects model is that these models correct for random measurement errors. The dis-
advantage of mixed-effects model is that these models might also correct for differential
item functioning, that is, the way different individuals answer the same question differently.
The literature offers some novel approaches, that is, parametric models, to address this
problem (King et al. 2004). Our research design, however, does not allow applying these
novel approaches.
Results and Discussion
Table 4 shows the results of the regression.
Model 2 indicates that pay for performance in general raises the intention of our par-
ticipants to make additional commitments to work (b5 0.24***). In Model 3 we introduce
motivation as a further parameter for work effort. Intrinsic motivation strongly increases
additional work efforts (b 5 0.60***), whereas extrinsic motivation raises performance
only slightly (b 5 0.11*). Model 4 takes account of the interaction between motivation
and pay for performance. In line with Hypotheses H2, the ﬁndings show that pay for
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Table 4
Study 2: Empirical Results of the Multilevel Mixed-Effects Linear Regression (447 vignettes from 149 people)
Dependent Variable
Additional Performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Independent Variables: Est. Signiﬁcance T Est. Signiﬁcance T Est. Signiﬁcance T Est. Signiﬁcance T
External incentive:
2 Performance-contingent pay .24 *** 2.56 .23 *** 2.75 .68 1.36
Motivation:
3 Intrinsic motivation .60 *** 10.12 .71 *** 9.08
4 Extrinsic motivation .11 * 1.88 2.03 2.53
External incentive  motivation:
Performance-contingent
pay  intrinsic motivation
2.25 ** 22.19
Performance-contingent
pay  extrinsic motivation
.14 * 1.66
Control variables:
5 Realistic vignettes .33 *** 25.35 .34 *** 5.48 .26 *** 4.99 .22 *** 3.96
6 Gender 2.16 21.31 2.17 21.36 .02 .13 .02 .14
7 Year of birth 2.03 21.50 2.03 21.56 .00 .22 2.01 2.57
8 Length of employment 2.04 * 21.88 2.04 * 21.83 2.01 2.37 2.03 21.58
9 Complexity of knowledge
in current work
.16 ** 2.44 .15 ** 2.35 .03 .57 .12 * 1.87
Random effects: Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
SD (R.id) .48 .07 .50 .07 .47 .06 .51 .06
SD (residual) .77 .04 .75 .04 .65 .03 .63 .03
Model ﬁt
Log-restricted likelihood 2420 2418 2379 2382
Wald x2 (DF) 40 47 186 159
Prob . x2 .00 .00 .00 .00
Est., Estimate; R.id, Residual ID; DF, Degrees of freedom
*p , .1, **p , .05, ***p , .01.
4
0
3
performance has a strong negative effect on intrinsic motivation, and thus reduces the in-
tention to deliver additional effort at work (b 5 20.25** 5 hidden crowding-out effect).
Thus, the introduction of pay for performance reduces the intrinsically motivated compo-
nent of additional effort by 0.25. At the same time and in line with Hypotheses H3, pay for
performance has a positive effect on the extrinsic motivation of the participants and raises
the intention to make additional efforts at work (b5 0.14*5 hidden price effect). Thus, the
introduction of pay for performance increases the extrinsically motivated component of
additional effort at work by 0.14.
Implications and Limitations of our Research
Our meta-analysis clearly demonstrates that the task type moderates the effect of pay for
performance on performance. Pay for performance has a strong, positive effect on perfor-
mance in the case of noninteresting tasks. Pay for performance, however, tends to have
a negative effect on performance in the case of interesting tasks. The vignette study reveals
(a) why pay for performance sometimes undermines performance and (b) how pay for per-
formance produces hidden costs, which also need to be accounted for.
1. Pay for performance causes a cognitive shift, that is, it strengthens extrinsic motivation for
behavior (causes a price effect) and at the same time weakens intrinsic motivation for
behavior (causes a crowding-out effect). Depending on the strength of these two opposing
effects, pay for performance either hurts or promotes personal efforts: The more intrinsic
motivation was there at the beginning, the more of it can be destroyed.
2. Hidden costs arise even if the price effect is stronger than the crowding-effect. The loss of
intrinsically motivated behavior has always to be compensated by external rewards.
Our ﬁndings help to explain the modest success of pay for performance in the public
sector, for ﬁve reasons. First, it seems that in the public sector high intrinsic motivation is
at stake (Cacioppe and Mock 1984; Crewson 1997; Jurkiewicz and Massey 1997; Perry
1997; Houston 2000; Buelens and Van den Broeck 2007). Thus, pay for performance can
potentially create a strong crowding-out effect. Second, public funding is clearly more lim-
ited than private sector funding. As a result—and as suggested by a number of studies—the
price effect of pay for performance in public management tends to be rather small
(Ingraham 1993; Kellough and Lu 1993; Moon 2000), whereas the crowding-out effect
in the case of interesting, and thus potentially intrinsically rewarding, tasks may weigh
considerably. Third, pay for performance might reduce investments in policy expertise
and select the wrong type of employees as pointed out by the study of Gailmard and Patty
(2007). Fourth, the so-called multitasking problem (e.g., Holmstro¨m and Milgrom 1991)
can pose an additional difﬁculty for implementing pay for performance in the public sector:
Pay for performance requires the precise measuring of performance and the attribution of
this performance to individual efforts to be effective. However, public service institutions
often have to deliver complex products and services such as ‘‘good health’’ or ‘‘good ed-
ucation’’ (Plant 2003). To specify every aspect of such tasks is often very difﬁcult. As
a result, extrinsically motivated persons, subject to a pay for performance system, have
a strong incentive to fulﬁll only what is easy to measure, that is, the quantiﬁable
performance-related aspects of a task. What is not easy to measure is disregarded, though
it might be important for fulﬁlling the task (for examples from the public sector, see
Dalrymple 2004; van Bockel and Noordegraaf 2006). A more subjective performance
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evaluation could address the problem of multitasking but creates new problems instead.
Subjective performance evaluation procedures are subject to systematic cognitive biases
in evaluation (e.g., Rynes, Gerhart, and Parks 2005) and might be considered as pro-
cedurally unfair as they cannot provide consistency and objectivity in the same way as
objective evaluations do. Fifth, from a politico-economic perspective, the application of
performance-contingent rewards also carries the danger of political manipulation. Political
economists have traditionally focused on politicians’ possibilities and incentives to manip-
ulate the criteria by which they are evaluated (e.g., Frey 1983; Benz and Frey 2007). In this
view, pay for performance for politicians and high-level public service agents does not
make sense because these individuals are the ones who decide the very standards by which
they are compensated.
Our research also suggests in which areas pay for performance might have the potential
to augment performance in the public sector. Performance-related pay can successfully
boost personal efforts in the case of less interesting tasks, for example, tasks that require
low investments in policy expertise.An early qualiﬁcation of theAmericanNationalResearch
Council panel of the experience with performance-related pay in public administration in the
1980s and early 1990s came toa similar conclusion (Milkovich andWigdor 1991).According
to Buelens and Van den Broeck (2007), lower level employees of public administration are
more likely to ﬁnd their job less interesting than managers in the public service and thus
might be valid candidates for pay for performance. Because the nature of these tasks is
not intrinsically rewarding, pay for performance in this case is likely to augment extrinsic
motivation for these tasks considerably, while there is no danger to destroy a great
amountof intrinsicmotivation. In addition, theoutcomeof such tasks ismore easy tomeasure
than complex tasks and thus problems of multitasking are less likely to play a role.
Four limitations of our research need to be addressed. First, our meta-analysis is based
on highly controlled experiments and ﬁeld experiments. Although experiments possess the
advantage of the isolated alteration of a few factors under controlled conditions (Starmer
1999), they lack external validity because of the high level of abstraction for the partic-
ipants (Harrison and List 2004). Thus, we should translate these ﬁndings carefully to the
real world. In the case of our vignette study, this abstraction is somewhat reduced as a real
administrative work context is simulated. Second, the vignette study has the drawback not
to observe real behavior but only behavioral intentions. Further research in the ﬁeld, pref-
erably ﬁeld experiments, is needed to analyze the effects of pay for performance on perfor-
mance in applied ﬁelds such as in public administration. Also a meta-analysis that is based on
applied ﬁeld studies and which compares the effects of pay for performance in the private and
the public sector could be an issue for further research. Third, as already mentioned we used
a mixed-effects model to study the cognitive shift. The problem with self-assessment ques-
tions is that answers to these differ across respondents according to the actual level and in-
terpersonal incomparability (differential item functioning along with random measurement
error). The inclusion of random effects possesses some advantages but might also hurt the
orthogonality assumption: Random effects not only correct for random measurement errors
but also correct for systematic person-speciﬁc effects, that is, the way different individuals
answer the same question differently (King et al. 2004). Our study does not disjoint both
effects. The literature started to offer parametric methods that address this problem. Further
studies should be aware of this issue and could apply more profound models. Fourth, our
design does not allow us to observe the path sizes of the hidden price effect or the hidden
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crowding-out effect depending on the level of pay for performance. To understand the hid-
den costs of rewards better, future research needs to measure the motivational effects of
different performance-contingent rewards on performance and motivation.
In the light of this current, albeit limited, evidence we propose that it might be wise to
follow a suggestion by Moynihan (2007) to retain the positive functions of performance
management—in particular its motivating feedback function (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan
1999)—by blocking pay for performance, which in the public sector might offer more dis-
advantages than advantages.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available at the Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory online (www.jpart.oxfordjournals.org).
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